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Abstract  
This paper examines a simple model of strategic interactions among firms that face at least some of the same 
rivals in two related markets (for goods 1 and 2). It shows that when firms compete in quantity, market prices 
increase as the degree of multi-market contact increases. However, the welfare consequences of multi-market 
contact are more complex and depend on how two fundamental forces play themselves out. The first is the 
selection effect, which works towards increasing welfare as shutting down the more inefficient firm is beneficial. 
The second opposing effect is the internalisation of the Cournot externality effect; reducing the production of 
good 2 allows firms to sustain a higher price for good 1. This works towards increasing prices and, therefore, 
decreasing consumer surplus (but increasing producer surplus). These two effects are influenced by the degree 
of asymmetry between markets 1 and 2 and the degree of substitutability between goods 1 and 2. 
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This paper examines a simple model of strategic interactions among
￿rms that face at least some of the same rivals in two related markets
(for goods 1 and 2). It shows that when ￿rms compete in quantity,
market prices increase as the degree of multi-market contact increases.
However, the welfare consequences of multi-market contact are more
complex and depend on how two fundamental forces play themselves
out. The ￿rst is the selection e⁄ect, which works towards increasing
welfare as shutting down the more ine¢ cient ￿rm is bene￿cial. The
second opposing e⁄ect is the internalisation of the Cournot external-
ity e⁄ect; reducing the production of good 2 allows ￿rms to sustain
a higher price for good 1. This works towards increasing prices and,
therefore, decreasing consumer surplus (but increasing producer sur-
plus). These two e⁄ects are in￿ uenced by the degree of asymmetry
between markets 1 and 2 and the degree of substitutability between
goods 1 and 2.
JEL Classi￿cation: L11, L13, L44.
Keywords: mergers; multi-market competition; Cournot externality; cost
e¢ ciency.
11 Introduction
Multi-market competition refers to the situation in which a ￿rm faces at least
some of the same rivals in multiple markets.1 More speci￿cally, under multi-
market competition a ￿rm that is active across multiple markets might ￿nd
itself competing with ￿rms that are also present in multi-markets and ￿rms
that are only present in a given market. This is a pervasive phenomenon in
modern economies and the subject of this paper.
Examples of multi-market competition can be found in the telecommu-
nications, banking, and air transportation industries. Telecommunication
carriers compete in mobile and ￿xed telephony, voice and data services with
companies that provide the full gamut of services and companies that only
provide a subset of the services (e.g., data services). Commercial banks of-
fering a full portfolio of ￿nancial products such as insurance, home loans,
personal loans and credit cards compete not only with other full service
banks but also with providers that o⁄er only home loans or personal loans
or insurance. Full service airlines (and their discount airline subsidiaries)
compete with other full service airlines and with discount airlines.
Economic conventional wisdom once suggested2 that when ￿rms com-
pete against the same rivals in multiple markets, the intensity of competition
may su⁄er. The mechanism(s) through which competition would be softened
were not, however, well understood. Bernheim and Whinston￿ s (1990) sem-
inal paper suggested a mechanism through which competition would su⁄er
with multi-market contact: concerted or coordinated e⁄ects. By consid-
ering a supergame model where ￿rms repeatedly compete with each other
over time, these authors show that when ￿rms interact in multiple mar-
kets, the opportunities for punishing deviations from collusive outcomes are
enhanced. As punishing deviators becomes easier under multi-market com-
petition, it is easier to sustain cooperative outcomes.3 We should stress that
1See Chen and Ross (2007).
2See, for example, Edwards (1955).
3Scott (1982, 1983) uses cross-industry data and ￿nd a positive link between multi-
market contact and pro￿ts. Additional support for the hypothesis that multimarket con-
tact leads to higher prices is also found in several single-indusry studies. Examples include
Parker and Roller (1997) in telecommunications and Pillo⁄ (1999) in banking.
2this theoretical work is by no means conclusive. The collusive equilibrium
identi￿ed by Bernheim and Whinston is one of the in￿nite many equilibria
that result from the application of the folk theorem to in￿nitely-repeated
games.
Our emphasis is, however, on unilateral e⁄ects. We are interested in
the short-run strategic interactions that arise when ￿rms compete across
di⁄erent markets. We provide a direct mechanism through which increased
multi-market contact leads to higher prices.
We also explore two related questions in this paper. The ￿rst question
is normative in nature. We examine di⁄erent market structures ￿from no
multi-market contact to full multi-market contact ￿and investigate market
outcomes (e.g., prices and quantities) and welfare. We identify the socially
optimal market structure contingent on the degree of asymmetry between
the markets. The second question is positive in nature. We then ask the
following question, if we allow ￿rms to merge, which mergers would be prof-
itable and what would be the likely resulting market structure.
Our paper is closely related to Chen and Ross (2007). They focused
on the e⁄ects of multi-market competition on prices and welfare when ￿rms
serve two di⁄erent markets with a single production facility and an increasing
marginal cost technology. Although the demand functions are independent
in their model, the link between the markets arises as the larger the produc-
tion in one market, the higher the marginal cost in the other market. These
authors then use this framework to explain phenomena that are not fully
understood in competition analysis: the issues of recoupment (lower prices
in one market are compensated by higher prices in other markets) and retal-
iatory entry. In contrast, our model considers interdependent demands and
focuses on the impacts of mergers on prices, welfare and market structure
with constant marginal costs.
Our analysis of multi-market competition has potentially important im-
plications for competition law and policy. Standard merger analysis is con-
cerned with price and welfare e⁄ects in the relevant market ￿a market that
is de￿ned essentially by the substitution possibilities. Our analysis suggests
that although goods might not be in the same relevant market from the
point of view of competition law, under multi-market competition a merger
3might have more complex e⁄ects (both positive and negative) beyond the
immediate relevant market. It stands to reason that competition analysis
should take such e⁄ects into consideration.
2 The Basic Setup
We consider preferences for goods 1 and 2 represented by the following social
welfare function:









where m represents all other goods in the economy. The inverse demand
curves for the two goods are given by:
P1 = ￿1 ￿ (Q1 + ￿Q2) (2)
and
P2 = ￿2 ￿ (￿Q1 + Q2): (3)
The parameter ￿ measures the degree of product di⁄erentiation. If ￿ = 0,
the demand for the two goods are independent. If ￿ > 0 the two goods are
substitutes, and the two goods are complements if ￿ < 0. The analysis in
this paper focuses on the case of substitutes. We assume that the marginal
costs of production in markets 1 and 2 are equal to c1 and c2, respectively,
and that there are no ￿xed costs. Under this framework, the total surplus
(denoted by TS) is derived from the utility function given in Equation 1.
Consumer surplus (CS) is de￿ned as TS ￿ ￿, where ￿ is the sum of ￿rms￿
pro￿ts.
The following de￿nition is helpful in keeping our notations as simple as
possible:
De￿nition 1 Let a ￿ (￿1 ￿ c1) ￿ (￿2 ￿ c2) and ￿1 ￿ c1 = 1. Without loss
of generality, assume a ￿ 0.
The index a summarises the asymmetry between the two markets. For
a = 0, the two markets are symmetric.
We discuss three market structures in this paper. In our benchmark
market structure (see Figure 1), there are two ￿rms (A and B) that produce
4good 1 and two ￿rms (C and D) that produce good 2. Firms compete by
setting quantities. This simple framework allows us to capture both closer
intra-market competition (e.g., between ￿rms A and B) and also more dis-
tant inter-market competition (e.g., between ￿rms in market 1 and ￿rms
in market 2). Moreover, it also allows us to investigate the consequences
of changes in the market structure that a⁄ect intra and inter-market com-
petition. In particular, we will consider a market structure where ￿rms A
and C and are allowed to o⁄er both goods while facing di⁄erent rivals in
each market (see Figure 2). We refer to this market structure as partial
multi-market contact. In the last structure we consider, both A and C and
B and D have merged so that these two ￿rms compete with each other in











Figure 1: The Benchmark (B).





Figure 2: Partial Multi-Market Contact (P).





Figure 3: Full Multi-Market Contact (F).
2.1 Market Equilibrium
In this subsection we characterise the market equilibria under the various
market structures. This is presented in Table 1 below. As the degree of
asymmetry, a, increases, ￿rms cease o⁄ering product 2. Di⁄erent market
structures have di⁄erent critical a values for corner solutions to eventuate.
Since multi-market ￿rms have more incentives to exit market 2 to internalise
the externality between the two markets, the critical value a is the the lowest
in market structure F (a ￿ 1 ￿ ￿) and the highest in market structure B
(a ￿
3￿2￿
3 ). For market structure P, the critical value of a is in between the
other two cases, a ￿
(3￿￿)(1￿￿)
3+￿2 . Since for a ￿
3￿2￿
3 , all market structures
give the same market outcome with Q2 = 0, we present the analysis for the
case a <
3￿2￿
3 : All proofs are in the appendix. Omitted for simplicity, in all
cases, the consumer surplus is computed as:









In the next section, we illustrate how the two fundamental e⁄ects ￿the
selection and the internalisation of the Cournot externality e⁄ects ￿drive
the strategic interaction among ￿rms in the three market structures.
2.2 Prices and Welfare
In this subsection we present price and welfare comparison across the three





3+￿2 ￿ a ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ a
B
qA = qB =
3￿2￿(1￿a)
(3+2￿)(3￿2￿); qC = qD =
3(1￿a)￿2￿
(3+2￿)(3￿2￿); Q1 = 2qA;
Q2 = 2qC; ￿A = ￿B =
(3￿2￿(1￿a))2























qA1 = qB =
2￿￿(1￿a)
2(3￿￿2) ;





(3￿￿2) ; Q2 =
3(1￿a)￿2￿
2(3￿￿2) ;









qA1 = qB1 =
1￿￿(1￿a)
3(￿+1)(1￿￿); qA2 = qB2 =
1￿a￿￿
3(1￿￿)(￿+1)
Q1 = 2qA1;Q2 = 2qA2; ￿A = ￿B =
2￿2￿(1￿a)￿2a+a2
9(1+￿)(1￿￿)






￿A = ￿B = 1
9.
Table 1: Summary of the market equilibrium.
are always higher under full multi-market contact. This is intuitive since the
multi-market ￿rm has less incentives to expand its output. Output expan-
sion in one market hurts not only its pro￿tability in the given market, but
also the pro￿tability in the other market. In the tables, we use superscript
B (P, F) to denote variables for market structure B (P, F).





























Table 2: Price rankings.
Proof. With market outputs given in Table 1, market prices are computed
through Equations 2 and 3. The price comparison is straightforward, and
the proof is not included here. The proof is available upon request.
7While Proposition 1 is perhaps not surprising, the welfare comparison
is less straightforward as indicated in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The welfare ranking is summarised in Table 3.
a ￿ (8￿3￿20￿2￿24￿+45)(3￿2￿)
135￿12￿2￿16￿4 TSB > TSP > TSF
(8￿3￿20￿2￿24￿+45)(3￿2￿)
135￿12￿2￿16￿4 ￿ a ￿ (9￿3￿￿4￿2)(3￿2￿)
3(9￿2￿2) TSP > TSB > TSF
(9￿3￿￿4￿2)(3￿2￿)
3(9￿2￿2) ￿ a ￿
16￿3￿12￿2￿78￿+81
81￿12￿2 TSP > TSF > TSB
a ￿
16￿3￿12￿2￿78￿+81
81￿12￿2 TSF ￿ TSP ￿ TSB
Table 3: Welfare rankings.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The results in Proposition 2 re￿ ects the tension between the selection ef-
fect (shutting down the ine¢ cient ￿rms is bene￿cial) and the internalisation
of the Cournot externality e⁄ect (reducing the production of good 2 allows
￿rms to sustain a higher price for good 1). These two e⁄ects are in￿ uenced
by the degree of asymmetry (a) between markets 1 and 2 and the degree of
substitutability (￿ ) between goods 1 and 2.
From the consumer￿ s point of view, market structure B always yields
the highest surplus since prices are the lowest. However, as a increases, the
asymmetry between the two markets increases, and social welfare may in-
crease with the presence of multi-market ￿rms since there is more e¢ ciency
gain from reducing the production of good 2. Therefore, with a low a, the
social welfare is the highest in market structure B. As a gets very large, mar-
ket structure F dominates. Market structure P is the best for intermediate
values of a. Note that all the critical a values listed in Table 3 decrease as ￿
increases. The band for market structure P to maximise the social welfare
is the widest for intermediate values of ￿.
3 Endogenous Mergers
This section examines two related questions. First, we ask what mergers
are pro￿table in each market structure. For the full multi-market structure,
there is only one merger possible ￿a merger from two ￿rms producing the
8two goods to a single ￿rm producing two goods. Such merger to monopoly
is clearly pro￿table. The determination of the pro￿tability of mergers for
the two other market structures is more complex and it is summarised by
Propositions 3 and 4 below. These propositions also allow us to answer a
second question: what market structure is more likely to arise in an envi-
ronment where the benchmark ￿rms were allowed to pursue any pro￿table
mergers? We present the key factors in these two propositions, and the
detailed conditions are available in the appendix.
Proposition 3 Conditions for pro￿table mergers in the benchmark market





3+￿2 ￿ a ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ a
Inter-market
(e.g., A & C )
not pro￿table not pro￿table large a
Intra-market
(e.g., A & B)
￿ ￿ 0:66 ￿ ￿ 0:66 ￿ ￿ 0:66
Inter + intra









Table 4: Pro￿table mergers under market structure B.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We should note that for the merger between three ￿rms ￿for example,
￿rms A, B, and C ￿the merger pro￿tability analysis is undertaken against
the pre merger pro￿ts, ￿A, ￿B, and ￿C. This is the standard approach.
Di⁄erent answers may be obtained if the reference point is a two-￿rm merger
￿rst ￿for example, ￿rms A and B ￿followed by the pro￿tability analysis of
adding another ￿rm ￿for example, ￿rm C ￿into this coalition.
Proposition 3 suggests that whether or not an intra-market merger is
pro￿table depends only on ￿. For ￿ = 0, the two markets are independent,
and an intra-market merger is simply a merger between duopolists to form
a monopolist. Such a merger is always pro￿table. This suggests that under
our set-up with both inter and intra competition, a merger of the two ￿rms
within one market is only pro￿table if the two markets are relatively isolated.
9Proposition 3 also shows that an inter-market merger is pro￿table for large
a. In particular, a two-￿rm inter-market merger is only pro￿table in the
parameter range where the merged entity ceases production in market 2.
The merged entity produces more of good 1 and shuts down the production
of good 2. This yields higher pro￿ts in market 1 when a is large. In this
case it is also easier for this merger to satisfy the incentive compatibility
constraints as the ￿rm in market 2 would have lower pre-merger pro￿t.
For a merger between three ￿rms (inter- plus intra-market merger), the
condition required is typically a large a. A lower ￿ reduces the threshold
a required. It is possible for a three-￿rm merger to be pro￿table for small
a and relatively isolated markets (￿ ￿
q
1
2). In this parameter range (a ￿
(3￿￿)(1￿￿)
3+￿2 ), the asymmetry between the markets is small and e¢ ciency gains
are therefore low. The merged entity continues to produce both goods. For
a merger to be pro￿table, it must then involve ￿rms with a large combined
output in the market. This result is analogous to the classic result of Salant,
Switzer and Reynolds (1983) that a merger among symmetric ￿rms is not
pro￿table unless it involves 80% of the ￿rms in the industry.
The proposition below summarises the pro￿tability analysis for mergers
under partial multi-market contact.
Proposition 4 Conditions for pro￿table mergers with partial multi-market















￿ ￿ 0:77 and large a ￿ ￿ 0:77 ￿ ￿ 0:77
Intra-market
A & D
￿ ￿ 0:6 and small a ￿ ￿ 0:77 and large a
￿ ￿ 0:77
or large a
AB ￿ AD for large a if both mergers are pro￿table
Table 5: Pro￿table mergers under market structure P.
Proof. See the Appendix.
10Since a merger in this market structure involves both intra- and inter-
market merger, in general, pro￿table mergers require ￿ to be small and a
to be large. An exception is the pro￿table AD merger for the parameter
range, a ￿
(3￿￿)(1￿￿)
3+￿2 . In this case, the asymmetry is small between the two
markets, there is no corner solution and the merged entity would continue
to produce both products. Thus, A and D would only have the incentives to
merge if a is small and ￿rm D also has signi￿cant pre merger output share.
These propositions also allow us to consider the following question. Start-
ing with the benchmark, if ￿rms A and C were to merge, would ￿rms B and
D ￿nd it pro￿table to merge (resulting in structure F) or would B and D
prefer to stay separate (resulting in structure P)? From the benchmark,
￿rms A and C only have the incentive to merge for high values of a. Fur-
thermore, the critical a value for pro￿table AC merger in market structure
B is higher than the critical a value for pro￿table BD merger in market
structure P. Therefore, if AC merger is pro￿talbe, ￿rms B and D would
always have the incentive to merge. For high values of a, market dynamics
might naturally result in a market structure where ￿rms operate in multiple
markets. Importantly, for high values of a, market structure F yields the
highest social welfare.4 Note that for intermediate values of a, structure P
maximises social welfare but this structure is unlikely to emerge given that
the associated merger is not pro￿table.
With the inclusion of both inter- and intra-market competition, ￿rst,
there exists endogenous mergers. Even with the presence of the outsider
￿rms, some ￿rms would still have the incentives to merge. The optimal
market structure depends on both a and ￿. The welfare e⁄ects of merger
thus also depend on both a and ￿.
4 Conclusion
This paper examines a simple model of multi-market competition. It shows
that when ￿rms compete in quantity, although full multi-market contact
might lead to higher prices, the welfare consequences are more complex
4Recall that this follows from the portfolio e⁄ect (that is, producing less of the ine¢ cient
good 2) rather than from lower prices.
11and depend on how two fundamental forces play themselves out. The ￿rst
is the selection e⁄ect, which works towards increasing welfare as shutting
down the ine¢ cient ￿rm is bene￿cial. The second opposing e⁄ect is the
internalisation of the Cournot externality e⁄ect; reducing the production
of good 2 allows ￿rms to sustain a higher price for good 1. This works
towards increasing prices and, therefore, decreasing the consumer surplus
(but increasing the producer surplus). These two e⁄ects are in￿ uenced by
the degree of asymmetry between markets 1 and 2 (a) and the degree of
substitutability (￿) between goods 1 and 2. The higher a is, the more
relatively ine¢ cient market 2 is, and the stronger the selection e⁄ect. The
higher ￿ is, the more closely linked the two markets are and the stronger
the externality e⁄ect would be. A merger would internalise the e⁄ects more
when ￿ is large. This would make the merged entity a lot less aggressive
and hence unlikely to raise pro￿ts for the merged entity. On top of this, a
lower ￿ would imply more isolated markets and would make intra-market
merger more pro￿table. Therefore, the general result is that merger is more
likely to be pro￿table when ￿ is low.
This analysis should be viewed as a preliminary step towards understand-
ing the dynamics of multi-market competition. It simply illustrates that
mergers can increase welfare under multi-market competition. Although
this result is not per se new5, its novelty arises from the fact the increase
in welfare might not originate from the market (as strictly de￿ned from a
competition analysis perspective) where the merger takes place but instead
from a related market. This raises important issues for merger analysis
under competition law.
This framework, however, can be generalised in a number of directions.
There are four major areas that deserve further examination. First, it is
important to understand how the two e⁄ects identi￿ed in the paper ￿the
selection and internalisation of externality e⁄ects ￿play themselves out when
there are more than two ￿rms in both markets. It is important to understand
how an increase in the number of competitors a⁄ects their impacts on both
inter- and intra-markets competition. Second, one can explicitly consider
5See, for example, Perry and Porter (1985); and Farrell and Shapiro (1990).
12the existence of common ￿xed costs across markets (synergies). This will
strengthen the selection e⁄ect and may also mean greater gains under full
multi-market contact. Third, we can extend the framework to consider
other pricing schemes. For example, we can allow ￿rms that o⁄er the two
products to compete by o⁄ering bundles. We conjecture that this can lead
to very ￿erce competition under full multi-market contact. Fourth, we can
use this simple framework to consider the scope for a ￿rm that o⁄ers the
two goods to behave anti-competitively in order to exclude rivals from one
of the markets.
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5 Appendix
Market equilibrium in three market structures: For a ￿rm i operat-
ing in market j only, the optimisation problem is maxqi (Pj ￿ cj)qi. For a
multi-product ￿rm i operating in both markets, the optimisaiton problem is
maxqi1;qi2 (P1 ￿ c1)qi1+(P2 ￿ c2)qi2, where qi1 and qi2 are the multi-product
￿rm￿ s quantity choices in the two markets.
(1) Market structure B: For ￿rm i, i 2 fA;Bg, in market 1, the best
responses are qi =
1￿qj￿￿(qC+qD)
2 ; where i;j 2 fA;Bg and i 6= j: For ￿rms
C and D: qC =
1￿a￿￿(qA+qB)￿qD
2 and qD =
1￿a￿￿(qA+qB)￿qC
2 . Solving the
four best responses simultaneously gives the interior solutions: qA = qB =
3￿2￿(1￿a)
(3+2￿)(3￿2￿) and qC = qD =
3(1￿a)￿2￿
(3+2￿)(3￿2￿); with ￿A = ￿B =
(3￿2￿(1￿a))2
(2￿+3)2(3￿2￿)2
and ￿C = ￿D =
(2￿￿3(1￿a))2
(2￿+3)2(3￿2￿)2: Since market 2 is relatively ine¢ cient, the
corner solution involves q￿
C = q￿



















￿ 0. This holds for a ￿
3￿2￿
3 :
(2) Market structure P: Solving for the three ￿rms￿optimisation prob-





2 , qB =
1￿qA1￿￿(qA2+qD)
2 , and qD =
1￿a￿￿(qA1+qB)￿qA2
2 .
This gives the interior solutions: qA1 =
4a￿￿4￿+￿2+3




(￿+3)(3￿￿), and qD =
3(1￿a)￿￿
(￿+3)(3￿￿):
With production in both markets, ￿rm A has more incentive to exit
market 2 as a gets large. For qA2 = 0, qA1 =
1￿qB￿￿qC





2 : This gives qA1 = qB =
a￿￿￿+2
2(3￿￿2) and qD =
3(1￿a)￿2￿
2(3￿￿2) :
These quantities indeed gives qA2 = 0 if a ￿
(3￿￿)(1￿￿)
3+￿2 : Finally, as in the
14benchmark case, qA2 = qD = 0 if a ￿
3￿2￿
3 : It can be veri￿ed that the
combinations qA2 = qB = 0 and qA1 = qD = 0 can never be supported as an
equilibrium.
(3) Market structure F: The symmetric ￿rms￿best responses are qA1 =
1￿2￿qA2￿qB1￿￿qB2
2 , qA2 =
1￿a￿2￿qA1￿￿qB1￿qB2





2 : Solving the four best responses simultaneously
gives the interior solutions: qA1 = qB1 =
1￿￿(1￿a)
3(￿+1)(1￿￿) and qA2 = qB2 =
1￿a￿￿
3(1￿￿)(￿+1): From the best responses, qA2 = qB2 = 0 if a ￿ 1 ￿ ￿. The
market equilibrium in this case is qA1 = qB1 = 1
3. It can be veri￿ed that
this is the only corner solution in this market structure.
Proof. of Proposition 2: From Equation 1, the total surplus is represented




1 + 2￿Q1Q2 + Q2
2
￿
= CS + ￿:








, TSB ￿ TSF if a ￿
(9￿3￿￿4￿2)(3￿2￿)












TSB ￿ TSP if a ￿ (8￿3￿20￿2￿24￿+45)(3￿2￿)
135￿12￿2￿16￿4 : Note that (8￿3￿20￿2￿24￿+45)(3￿2￿)
(135￿12￿2￿16￿4) ￿
3￿2￿
3 : Finally, TSF ￿ TSP if a ￿
16￿3￿12￿2￿78￿+81
81￿12￿2 : Note that
1 ￿ ￿ ￿
















8￿3 ￿ 20￿2 ￿ 24￿ + 45
￿
(3 ￿ 2￿)













TSB ￿ TSF if
a ￿
￿(￿ + 3)(1 ￿ ￿)(3 ￿ 2￿)
2 +
q
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + 3)(3 ￿ ￿)(￿ + 1)(3 ￿ 2￿)
2 (2￿ + 3)
2






2￿(27￿2￿2) ￿ 1 ￿ ￿:
Similarly, TSP ￿ TSF if
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
45 ￿ 45￿ + 42￿2 ￿ 4￿4￿
￿
q
16￿2 (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)(15 ￿ ￿2)(3 ￿ ￿2)
2




45 ￿ 45￿ + 42￿2 ￿ 4￿4￿
+
q
16￿2 (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)(15 ￿ ￿2)(3 ￿ ￿2)
2





























in this case, TSB ￿
TSP if
a ￿
￿(￿ + 2)(1 ￿ ￿)(2￿ ￿ 3)
2 (￿ ￿ 3)
2
￿ (405 ￿ 32￿4 + 27￿2)
+
q
(1 ￿ ￿)(2 ￿ ￿)(￿ + 2)(￿ + 1)(2￿ + 3)
2 (￿ + 3)
2 (￿ ￿ 3)
2 (2￿ ￿ 3)
2
￿ (405 ￿ 32￿4 + 27￿2)
:
Note that
￿(￿ + 2)(1 ￿ ￿)(2￿ ￿ 3)
2 (￿ ￿ 3)
2
￿ (405 ￿ 32￿4 + 27￿2)
+
q
(1 ￿ ￿)(2 ￿ ￿)(￿ + 2)(￿ + 1)(2￿ + 3)
2 (￿ + 3)
2 (￿ ￿ 3)
2 (2￿ ￿ 3)
2
￿ (405 ￿ 32￿4 + 27￿2)
￿
(3 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)









in this case, TSP ￿ TSF if
a ￿
￿2(￿ + 6)(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 3)
2 +
q
4(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + 6)(6 ￿ ￿)(￿ + 1)(￿ ￿ 3)
2 (￿ + 3)
2









Proof. of Proposition 3: Case 1 (
(3￿￿)(1￿￿)
(￿2+3) ￿ a): (i) A merges with C: If
A merges with C, and B and D remain separated, the market structure be-








(3+2￿)2(3￿2￿)2. This holds for a ￿
(3￿2￿)(4￿3￿25￿2￿12￿+4￿4+36)






(ii) A merges with B: The merged ￿rm has the best response: qAB =
1￿￿(qC+qD)
2 : For ￿rm i in market 2, the best response is qi =
1￿a￿￿qAB￿qj
2 :
This gives the interior solutions: qAB =
3￿2￿(1￿a)
2(3￿￿2) and qC = qD =
2(1￿a)￿￿
2(3￿￿2) .












(iii) Compare the AC merger and AB merger: For the parameter range
where both mergers are pro￿table, AB merger always gives higher pro￿t.
(iv) C mergers with D: The best responses are qA =
1￿qB￿￿qCD
2 , qB =
1￿qA￿￿qCD
2 , and qCD =
1￿a￿￿(qA+qB)
2 : The interior solution is qA = qB =
2￿￿(1￿a)
2(3￿￿2) and qCD =
3(1￿a)￿2￿

















2 , and qD =
1￿a￿￿qABC1￿qABC2
2 : For the given pa-
rameter range, the ￿rm ABC would cease to o⁄er good 2: In equilibrium,
qABC2 = 0, qABC1 =
2￿￿(1￿a)
4￿￿2 and qD =
2(1￿a)￿￿
4￿￿2 . Firms A, B, and C would
have incentives to merge if
(2 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ a))
2
(￿ + 2)
2 (2 ￿ ￿)
2 ￿ 2
(3 ￿ 2￿ (1 ￿ a))
2
(3 + 2￿)
2 (3 ￿ 2￿)
2 +
(3(1 ￿ a) ￿ 2￿)
2
(3 + 2￿)




￿(2 ￿ ￿)(3 ￿ 2￿)
￿
￿4￿2 + 7￿ ￿ 7￿3 ￿ 4￿4 + 24
￿
25￿2 ￿ 17￿4 + 8￿6 ￿ 144
+
q
2(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + 1)(2 ￿ ￿2)(2￿ + 3)
2 (2 ￿ ￿)
2 (￿ + 2)
2 (3 ￿ 2￿)
2













1 ￿ ￿ for ￿ ￿ 0:89. For most of the parameter range in this case, ￿rms A,
B, and C would have the incentive to merge.
Case 2 (a ￿
(3￿￿)(1￿￿)
(￿2+3) ): (i) A and C merge: Firms A and C would
have the incentive to merge since in this case
2(1 ￿ ￿)(3 ￿ ￿)
2 (1 ￿ a) + 9a2 + 7a2￿2
(3 + ￿)
2 (3 ￿ ￿)
2 (1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
(3 ￿ 2￿ (1 ￿ a))
2
(3 + 2￿)
2 (3 ￿ 2￿)
2+
(3(1 ￿ a) ￿ 2￿)
2
(3 + 2￿)
2 (3 ￿ 2￿)
2:










(￿2+3) . for a ￿
(2￿￿)(1￿￿)
2+￿2 , as


















6(1￿￿)(1+￿) , and qD = 1￿a
3 . Firms A, B, and C would have
the incentive to merge if
￿
18a￿ ￿ 18￿ ￿ 8a + 4a2 + 5￿2 ￿ 10a￿2 + 5a2￿2 + 13
￿
36(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ 2
(3 ￿ 2￿ (1 ￿ a))
2
(3 + 2￿)
2 (3 ￿ 2￿)
2 +
(3(1 ￿ a) ￿ 2￿)
2
(3 + 2￿)
2 (3 ￿ 2￿)
2:
This holds for ￿ ￿
q
1
2 ￿ 0:7: For ￿ >
q
1
2, A, B, and C would have
incentives to merge if
a ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(3 ￿ 2￿)
￿




72(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + 1)(2￿2 ￿ 1)(2￿ ￿ 3)
2 (2￿ + 3)
2
￿ (80￿4 ￿ 8￿2 + 153)
:
Proof. of Proposition 4: Case 1 (1￿￿ ￿ a): (i) A merge with B: The post
merger market structure is the same as the merger between A, B, and C in











(ii) A merge with D: The merged ￿rm has best responses qAD1 =
1￿qB￿2￿qAD2
2 and qAD2 =
1￿a￿2￿qAD1￿￿qB
2 : For ￿rm B, the best response is
qB =
1￿qAD1￿￿qAD2





2(1￿￿2), and qB = 1
3. It can be veri￿ed that the merged entity
would never cease production in market 1. For market 2, if qAD2 = 0,
qAD1 = qB = 1
3: These quantities would indeed induce qAD2 = 0 if a ￿ 1￿￿:
This holds in this case. Therefore, ￿rms A and D would have the incentive
















(iii) It is more pro￿table for A to merge with D rather than B if 1
9 ￿
(2￿￿(1￿a))2
(￿+2)2(2￿￿)2: This holds for a ￿
3￿￿￿2￿2
3￿ : Note that
3￿￿￿2￿2
3￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿.
(iv) B merges with D: If ￿rms B and D merge, the market structure is
the same as market structure F. Both ￿rms A and BD do not o⁄er good 2.












The conditions are the same as the ones for pro￿table AD merger.
Case 2 (
(3￿￿)(1￿￿)
(￿2+3) ￿ a ￿ 1￿￿): (i) A and B merge: As analysed in Case





(ii) A and D merge: In this parameter range, the merged entity would
continue to produce in both markets. Firms A and D would have the incen-
tive to merge if
18a￿ ￿ 18￿ ￿ 18a + 9a2 + 5￿2 + 13
36(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿




















(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + 1)(￿2 + 1)(3 ￿ ￿2)
2
6￿ (￿2 + 1)












(iii) It is more pro￿table for A to merge with D rather than B if
18a￿ ￿ 18￿ ￿ 18a + 9a2 + 5￿2 + 13
36(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
(2 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ a))
2
(￿ + 2)
2 (2 ￿ ￿)
2:



















3(5￿4￿12￿2+16) ￿ 1 ￿ ￿.
(iv) B merges with D: The market structure is the same as market
structure F. In this parameter range, both ￿rms o⁄er both goods. Firms B
and D would have the incentive to merge if
￿
2a￿ ￿ 2￿ ￿ 2a + a2 + 2
￿
9(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿





















8￿2 (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + 1)(3 ￿ 2￿2)(3 ￿ ￿2)
2



















13 , ￿rms B and D would have incentives to merge if
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿




8￿2 (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + 1)(3 ￿ 2￿2)(3 ￿ ￿2)
2








8￿2 (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + 1)(3 ￿ 2￿2)(3 ￿ ￿2)
2
























Case 3 (a ￿
(3￿￿)(1￿￿)
(￿2+3) ): (i) A merges with B: Firms A and B have the
incentive to merge if
(2 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ a))
2
(￿ + 2)
2 (2 ￿ ￿)
2
￿
2(1 ￿ ￿)(3 ￿ ￿)
2 (1 ￿ a) + 9a2 + 7a2￿2
(￿ + 3)
2 (3 ￿ ￿)
2 (￿ + 1)(1 ￿ ￿)
+
(3 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ a))
2
(3 ￿ ￿)
2 (￿ + 3)
2:
This holds for
(1 ￿ ￿)(2 ￿ ￿)
￿




2(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)(2 ￿ 3￿2)(2 ￿ ￿)
2 (￿ + 2)
2
(3￿4 ￿ ￿2 + 16)
￿ a ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(2 ￿ ￿)
￿




2(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)(2 ￿ 3￿2)(2 ￿ ￿)
2 (￿ + 2)
2
(3￿4 ￿ ￿2 + 16)
:
This would never hold if ￿ ￿
q
2


















2 ￿ 1:85: Note that
(1 ￿ ￿)(2 ￿ ￿)
￿




2(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)(2 ￿ 3￿2)(2 ￿ ￿)
2 (￿ + 2)
2
(3￿4 ￿ ￿2 + 16)
￿









2+￿2 if ￿ ￿
q
1
2 ￿ 0:7: For
q
1




2, ￿rms A and B would have the incentive
to merge if
(1 ￿ ￿)(2 ￿ ￿)
￿




2(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)(2 ￿ 3￿2)(2 ￿ ￿)
2 (￿ + 2)
2
(3￿4 ￿ ￿2 + 16)
￿ a ￿
(3 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)












2+￿2 , the merged ￿rm AB produces both goods. Firms A
and B would have the incentives to merge if
￿
18a￿ ￿ 18￿ ￿ 8a + 4a2 + 5￿2 ￿ 10a￿2 + 5a2￿2 + 13
￿
36(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
2(1 ￿ ￿)(3 ￿ ￿)
2 (1 ￿ a) + 9a2 + 7a2￿2
(3 + ￿)
2 (3 ￿ ￿)
2 (1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
+
(3 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ a))
2
(3 ￿ ￿)
2 (￿ + 3)
2:






2+￿2 if ￿ ￿
q
1




2, ￿rms A and B would have the incentives to merge for a ￿
5￿￿3
5￿ .
(ii) A merges with D: Firms A and D would have the incentives to merge
if
18a￿ ￿ 18￿ ￿ 18a + 9a2 + 5￿2 + 13
36(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
2(1 ￿ ￿)(3 ￿ ￿)
2 (1 ￿ a) + 9a2 + 7a2￿2
(3 + ￿)
2 (3 ￿ ￿)
2 (1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
+
(3 ￿ 3a ￿ ￿)
2
(￿ + 3)
2 (3 ￿ ￿)
2:
This holds for a ￿
3￿5￿
3 . Note that
3￿5￿
3 ￿ 0 if ￿ ￿ 3
5.
(iii) B and D merger: B and D would have incentives to merge if
￿
2a￿ ￿ 2￿ ￿ 2a + a2 + 2
￿
9(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
(3 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ a))
2
(3 ￿ ￿)
2 (￿ + 3)
2 +
(3 ￿ 3a ￿ ￿)
2
(￿ + 3)
2 (3 ￿ ￿)
2:




2￿(5￿2+27) : Note that
￿(1 ￿ ￿)(3 ￿ ￿)
3 +
q
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + 1)(3 ￿ ￿)
3 (￿ + 3)
3
2￿ (5￿2 + 27)
￿
(3 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
(￿2 + 3)
:
21(iv) Comparison of AB and AD mergers: In this parameter range, both
merged ￿rms would continue to o⁄er both products. AB merger would give
higher pro￿ts compared with AD merger if
(2 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ a))
2
(￿ + 2)
2 (2 ￿ ￿)
2 ￿
18a￿ ￿ 18￿ ￿ 18a + 9a2 + 5￿2 + 13
36(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
:
This holds for
3(1 ￿ ￿)(2 ￿ ￿)
￿




16(5 ￿ ￿2)(1 ￿ ￿)
2 (2 ￿ ￿)
2 (￿ + 2)
2 (￿ + 1)
2
3(5￿4 ￿ 12￿2 + 16)
￿ a ￿
3(1 ￿ ￿)(2 ￿ ￿)
￿




16(5 ￿ ￿2)(1 ￿ ￿)
2 (2 ￿ ￿)
2 (￿ + 2)
2 (￿ + 1)
2
3(5￿4 ￿ 12￿2 + 16)
:
Note that
3(1￿￿)(2￿￿)(8￿￿3+2￿2+8￿)+
p
16(5￿￿2)(1￿￿)2(2￿￿)2(￿+2)2(￿+1)2
3(5￿4￿12￿2+16) ￿
(3￿￿)(1￿￿)
(￿2+3) :
22